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CONTROL GROUP TEST ADOPTED AS STANDARD FOR ASSERTION OF
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY CORPORATE CLIENT
United States v. Upjohn Company, 600 F.2d 1223
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 925 (1980)
In United States v. Upjohn Company' the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit ordered Upjohn's general counsel to disclose attorney-cli-
ent communications not protected under the control group test.2
In Upjohn the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sought to discover
documents compiled by Upjohn's general counsel through an internal
investigation into questionable corporate payments made to secure for-
eign governmental business.' Counsel sent questionnaires to officers
and employees of the company that urged candid and confidential re-
sponses.4 Upjohn voluntarily made disclosures to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)5 and to the IRS, thus prompting investi-
gation into the federal tax implications raised by the payments.6
1. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 445 U.S. 925 (1980). The court declined to
consider alternative standards developed in other federal courts. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'g on rehearing, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977);
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974); notes 41-47 infra and accompanying text.
2. The control group test was formulated in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition deniedsub nom. General Elec. Co.
v Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The control group
test limits application of the attorney-client privilege in a corporate context to those employees
who will make, or play a substantial role in making, decisions in response to counsel's legal ad-
vice. Only these employees personify the corporation to an extent sufficient to assert the privilege
in its behalf. See notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
3. In the proceeding before Magistrate Karr, the IRS characterized the payments made by
Upjohn as bribes or kickbacks. The Company's general counsel allowed that the payments might
have been for improper purposes. The Magistrate adopted the term "questionable payments."
United States v. Upjohn Co., [1978-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9277, at 83,598 (W.D. Mich.).
4. 600 F.2d at 1225. Returns were made directly to counsel. [1978-1] U.S. Tax Cas. 9277,
at 83,599. Summaries of subsequent oral interviews also became part of the compiled documents.
Access to these records was limited exclusively to counsel. Id.
5. 600 F.2d at 1225. At the time the disclosures were made, Upjohn was aware that other
companies were making similar disclosures. The SEC had indicated that more lenient treatment
was available to corporations voluntarily disclosing their involvement with the type payments in
question. [1978-11 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9277, at 83,599.
6. 600 F.2d at 1225. The IRS was concluding a routine audit of the Company's 1972 and
1973 consolidated federal income tax returns when it received a copy of the Form 8-K made to the
SEC. The audit consequently was held open and the matter referred to the Revenue Service's
Intelligence Division, which began an investigation for the years 1972, 1973, and 1974. The Com-
pany furnished the IRS with a schedule reflecting total payments of $700,000, which it believed
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Upjohn resisted the IRS summons7 claiming that the company's attor-
ney-client privilege protected the documents.' The IRS instituted suit,
and the district court, in accepting the magistrate's report and recom-
mendation,9 rejected Upjohn's arguments and enforced the summons.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, re-
manded,' ° and held: Only confidential communications made by em-
ployees responsible for directing corporate response to legal advice are
protected under the attorney-client privilege."t
The attorney-client privilege prevents disclosure of confidential com-
munications between attorney and client.' 2 The privilege is an essen-
had an effect on its tax returns. A second, less detailed schedule also was furnished, listing pay-
ments totaling $3,700,000, which the Company claimed did not affect its tax returns. The IRS
argued that there was insufficient data furnished to enable a determination regarding this second
schedule. The Company allowed employee interviews to be conducted by the IRS, but did not
permit questioning concerning the payments claimed to have no tax effect. [1978-1] U.S. Tax Cas.
9277, at 83,599-600.
7. See I.R.C. § 7602. This section authorizes the Secretary or his delegate to examine any
books, papers, records, or other data, which may be relevant or material to an inquiry for the
purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any tax return.
8. 600 F.2d at 1225. Upjohn also claimed that the documents in question were protected
under the work product doctrine. The Court dismissed the claim, holding the doctrine inapplica-
ble to administrative summons under I.R.C. § 7602 and citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48
(1964), as authority. 600 F.2d at 1228 n.13. While the applicability of Powell may be questioned
and division of opinion exists regarding work product defenses, see United States v. Bonnell, 483
F. Supp. 1070, 1079 (D. Minn. 1979), this comment does not develop the work product aspect of
the Upjohn holding.
9. [1978-1] U.S. Tax Cas. 9437 (W.D. Mich.). The district court of the United States for
the district where the person summoned by the IRS resides has jurisdiction to compel attendance
and production of the documents called for in the summons. See I.R.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a).
10. 600 F.2d at 1227-28. The case was remanded for a determination as to which communi-
cations in question were made by members of Upjohn's control group and for a denial of enforce-
ment of the summons with respect to these communications. Id.
11. Id. at 1225. The Upjohn court defined a corporation's control group as "those officers,
usually top management, who play a substantial role in deciding and directing the corporation's
response to the legal advice given." Id. at 1226.
12. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore
defines the privilege in the following manner:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
Id.
The roots of the privilege are traced to Roman law and date back at least to 1577 as part of the
English common-law doctrine. Justification for an exception to a general duty to disclose the
truth was found initially in the "oath and the honor" of an attorney not to divulge the secrets of
his client. Stricter judicial developments in 18th century England dismantled other exemptions
based on pledges of secrecy, but a concurrent rationalism shifted the attachment of the privilege
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tial part of the attorney-client relationship 3 because only a fully in-
formed counsel can render effective legal advice. 14 The client must be
able to entrust all relevant information to counsel without fear that ad-
versaries can compel disclosure to his detriment.' 5
The privilege has been criticized as an obstruction to full disclosure
of the truth 6 and as a contradiction to the expanded rules of discov-
ery.' 7 Nonetheless, the privilege has remained a recognized element of
our judicial system. 8 Because of the barrier it creates to discovery of
from the attorney to the client. Based on the premise that an attorney's silence was necessary to
elicit the client's trust, the privilege developed further and became a recognized doctrine of mod-
em common law. Id. § 2290, at 542-43.
13 600 F.2d at 1225. Judge Merritt, in describing the privilege, states:
lIt is an intrinsic part and a necessary incident of the attorney-client relationship. The
legal profession has an intimate relationship with its clients and an important role in the
administration of our system of justice. Privacy is the necessary context of the relation-
ship between the individual and his lawyer.
Id. Dean McCormick has commented:
Our adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for the party
whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the relationship, and this
sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to change our customs so as to make the
lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the client's confidential disclosures re-
garding professional business. Loyalty and sentiment are silken threads, but they are
hard to break.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 176 (2d ed. 1972).
14. 600 F.2d at 1226. After citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), to sup-
port the point that the privilege is based in part on the encouragement it gives clients to fully
inform their attorneys, Judge Merritt states that "finding the truth and achieving justice in an
adversary system are best served by fully-informed advocates . Id. See 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 12, § 2290. at 543; id. § 2291.
Additional support for the privilege comes from the notion that to the extent lawyers are more
fully informed by their clients there will result greater compliance with the law. Diversified In-
dus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane), rev'g on rehearing, 572 F.2d 596
(8th Cir. 1977); Burnham, The Atorney- Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901,
913-14 (1969); Miller, Getting to the Bottom or Digging Your Own Grave: The Applicability of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrines to Internal Corporate Investigations, 9 COLO.
LAW. 945, 949 (1980); Miller, The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262,
268-69 (1963); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation,
50 S. CALIF. L. REv. 303, 306 (1977). See notes 86-87 infra and accompanying text.
15. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 87, at 175; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 543;
id. § 2291, at 545. This security is a necessary step toward achieving justice in an adversary sys-
tem because a client first must be confident of counsel's unqualified loyalty and commitment. See
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 543; id. § 2291, at 545; Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 292 (1963); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as
AIpplied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 954 (1956).
16. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 554; Morgan, Foreword, MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE 26-27 (1942).
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
18. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (confidential disclosures by a client
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the truth, however, courts have adopted a narrow construction in an
attempt to confine the privilege to its purpose. 19 In Hickman v. Tay-
lor20 the Supreme Court recognized the tension between the principles
of broad discovery and privileged communications, but advocated that
they must coexist.
Courts generally have applied the attorney-client privilege to corpo-
rations. 2 1 In 1950 the district court for Massachusetts established gen-
eral guidelines applicable for a corporate claim to the privilege. The
to an attorney made in order to obtain legal advice are privileged); ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS No. 4 (lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client).
19. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445
U.S. 925 (1980); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950);
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 554.
20. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
21. Id. at 507-08. Justice Murphy noted in his opinion, "And as Rule 26b provides, further
limitations come into existence as the inquiry ... encroaches upon the recognized domain of
privileges." d. at 508.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 209(a) (1942); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
503(b)[04], at 38 (1979). Applicability of the privilege to corporations was challenged by the dis-
trict court for Northern Illinois in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771
(N.D. Ill.), opinion supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). See notes 28-30 infra and accompanying text. In reversing,
Chief Judge Hastings included a long list of cases holding corporations entitled to the privilege.
320 F.2d at 319-20 n.7. The issue has not been litigated since Radiant Burners. Corporate claim to
the privilege also has been held appropriate when asserted in regard to in-house counsel. See
Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D.
Pa. 1973); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Co., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); Comment, The
Application in the Federal Courts of the Attorney-Client Privilege to the Corporation, 39 FORDHAM
L. REV. 281, 287-90 (1970). For an article outlining the obligations of outside counsel in serving a
corporate client, see Van Dusen, The Responsibility of Lawyers.- Advising Management Under the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 46 N.Y.S.B.J. 565 (1974).
Applying the attorney-client privilege has posed conceptual difficulties for courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 925 (1980)
(application of privilege to corporate clients poses a somewhat different problem); C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 13, § 87, at 178 (question arises as to who speaks for corporation for purposes of
the privilege); Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the
Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 341 (1972) (issues raised in applying privilege to corporations
have vexed litigants and courts).
The problem is perhaps best stated by Judge Campbell in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), opinion supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill, 1962),
rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). In struggling with whether a
corporation is an appropriate claimant of the privilege, he finds the court "presented with the
anomalous situation of determining what persons within the corporate structure hold its confi-
dence and may properly be considered as its alter ego and therefore the 'client.' " Id. at 774
(emphasis in original). See notes 28-30 infra and accompanying text.
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court in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.23 implied that
communications of any corporate employee, which were not disclosed
publicly, were entitled to conditional protection.24 Commentators and
courts criticized this rule25 because it contradicted the general notion of
expanded discovery formulated in Hickman v. Taylor.26
Twelve years later, in Radiant Burners v. American Gas Association,27
the district court for Northern Illinois declared that only natural per-
sons could assert the attorney-client privilege.28 The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed,29 thus settling the issue of a corpora-
23. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
24. Id. at 358-59. The court stated the privilege would apply if
(1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer, (3) the
communicaiton relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. The court refused to extend the privilege to some of the documents because the communica-
tions were not made for the purpose of securing legal advice. Id. at 360-61.
25. See, e.g.. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960) (part
of interoffice communication between non-legal personnel that contained legal advice was privi-
leged). Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954) (corporation
as client could be represented by employees, officers, directors, and outside counsel). See also
Simon, supra note 15, at 959-60; Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews andthe Attorney-Client
Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoMM. L. REv. 873, 875 (1971).
26. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. RE. 360, 370-71 (1970).
27. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), opinion supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. 11M. 1962),
rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
28. In holding the privilege inapplicable to corporations, Judge Campbell voiced three basic
concerns. First, in analogizing the attorney-client privilege to the right against self-incrimination,
he felt the privilege to be a personal one and cited cases denying a corporation the right against
self-incrimination. 207 F.Supp. at 773 (citations omitted). Second, he noted problems in ascer-
taining the client's identity when a corporation asserts the privilege. Id. at 774. Finally, he con-
cluded that with the number of employees and the large amount of documents necessarily
involved in the corporate structure, a high potential for abuse existed through an expanded "zone
of silence." Id. at 774-75.
Professor Simon coined the term "zone of silence." See Simon, The Aiorney-Client Privilege as
Applied to Corporations, supra note 15, at 955. The author used the phrase to describe the insulat-
ing effect that could result from attorneys dealing frequently with large numbers of corporate
employees and masses of corporate documents. He commented: "Few judges-or legislators ei-
ther, for that matter-would long tolerate any common law privilege that allowed corporations to
insulate all their activities by discussing them with legal advisers." Id. at 955-56 (emphasis ad-
ded).
29. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963). See note 22 supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1046 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:1041
tion's right to claim attorney-client protection. The decision did not,
however, address the district court's concerns about the identity of the
corporate client or the potential for corporate abuse of the privilege.3 0
The court in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.31
limited the broad language of United Shoe when it stated that a corpo-
ration is entitled to protection only as to communications between an
attorney and members of its control group. The employees who suffi-
ciently personify the corporation to assert the privilege are those who
will make, or play a substantial role in, a decision based on legal advice
given by counsel.3 After Westinghouse many courts adopted the con-
trol group test and limited the privilege to members of upper manage-
ment levels. 4
A new test with a different emphasis emerged in Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Decker,35 as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the control group test.3 6 Focusing on the subject matter in-
30. See note 28 supra. See also American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211
F.Supp. 85, 88 n.12 (D. Del. 1962).
31. 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamusandprohibition deniedsub nom. General Elec. Co.
v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
32. 210 F.Supp. at 485. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
33. Id. In defining the test the court stated:
[Ihf the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a posi-
tion to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member
of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.
Id. See also 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 413, 418 (1979).
34. See Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 84-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (directors
of research not members of control group); Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315 (N.D. Okla. 1967)
(group leader not deemed to be within control group), modfiledon other grounds sub noma. Natta v.
Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.Supp. 515, 518
(S.D. Cal. 1963) (employees authorized to communicate confidential information held to be
outside control group for purposes of applying attorney-client privilege). The Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence adopted control group language by defining representative of the client as "one
having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant
thereto, on behalf of the client." PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(3), 46 F.R.D. 161, 250 (1969).
See McLaughlin, The Treatment ofAttorney-Client and Related Privileges in the Proposed Rules of
Evidencefor the United States District Courts, 26 THE REC. 30, 32-33 (1971). But see note 39 infra.
35. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), af'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971). Justice Douglas took no part in the decision. See also D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 60 Cal.2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964), which formulated a similar test.
36. 423 F.2d at 491-92. The control group test's flaws are most apparent in an antitrust case,
like Harper & Row, where middle level employees are involved in the wrongdoing. Without infor-
mation regarding the activities of these employees, counsel's service to the corporate client could
be substantially impaired. The artificial limitations imposed by the control group test undermine
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volved, the court held protected those communications, made at the
direction of an employee's superior, that dealt both with the legal prob-
lem at hand and the related duties of the questioned employee.3 7 An
equally divided Court did not resolve the conflict between Harper &
Row and Westinghouse, however, because it affimed the Harper &
Row decision without opinion.38
Court decisions rendered after Harper & Row reflected the split of
authority on the appropriate standard to ascertain the extent of protec-
tion afforded corporate communications with counsel.39 Several courts
combined various principles embodied in both the control group and
Harper & Row tests to adjudicate the particular fact patterns before
them.4" In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc. 41 the court decided
that a privileged document was one that was sent to or from a control
group member, or a representative necessary to the decisionmaking
the principles on which the attorney-clent privilege rests. See Comment, The PrivilegedFew. The
,4ttorne;-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 288, 302-03 (1972); 15
TULSA L.J. 390, 395 (1979). Concerning the realities of corporate structure, one commentator
notes: "In a complex corporate structure it is unreasonable to assume that uppper management
can provide all the information the attorney requires." Id. Another author criticizes: "Too often
middle management executives who probably do not qualify for inclusion in the control group, as
the courts have defined it, have responsibilities for making recommendations which are ratified
verbatim by the higher echelon management which would be part of the so-called 'control
group "' Mauer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352, 375
(1967).
For articles generally critical of the control group test, see Burnham, Confidentiality and the
Corporate Lawvern- The.4ttorney-Client Privilege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B. J. 542
(1968); Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege As It Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL. B.J. 376
(1965); Weinschel, supra note 25; Note, The ,4ttorney-Client Privilege: .4 Look at Its Effect on the
Corporate Client and the Corporate Executive, 55 IND. L.J. 407 (1980).
37. 423 F.2d at 491-92. The court stated:
[An employee of the corporation, though not a member of its control group, is suffi-
ciently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's
attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of
his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's
advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the perform-
ance by the employee of the duties of his employment.
Id.
38. 400 U.S. 348 (1971). Justice Douglas took no part in the decision.
39. The control group language used in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence was elimi-
nated, at least in part, because of this uncertainty and the criticism leveled at the control group test
after the Harper & Row decision. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 22, 503[01], at 14.
40. See Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Dunn Chem.
Co. v. Syborn Corp., [1975-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,561 (S.D.N.Y.); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco,
Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See notes 41-47 infra.
41. 397 F.Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
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process, and incident to a request for legal advice.42
In Diversfed Industries, Inc. v. Meredith43 the court formulated a
five-step test modifying Harper & Row.' The Diversfled test, while
favoring the subject matter approach, prohibited use of the attorney's
office as a regular stop along the route of intracorporate communica-
tion in order to facilitate a later claim to the privilege.45 In In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation46 the court focused on the communi-
cant's belief that the information provided was a necessary element in
the solution of a legal problem.47
A standard less rigid and arbitrary than the control group test gained
support in the district courts of the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and District
of Columbia Circuits, 48 and the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits.4 9 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit halted•
this trend and firmly adopted the control group test.5 The Sixth Cir-
cuit followed with its Upjohn holding."' The conflict among the cir-
cuits was thus crystallized and attorneys were compelled to surmise
which communications from a corporate client would be privileged
under the attorney-client rule.52
42. Id. at 1165.
43. 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'g on rehearing, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
44. The Diversofed court stated:
mhe attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if (I) the
communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee
making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior, (3) the supe-
rior made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject
matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and
(5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the
corporate structure, need to know its contents. We note, moreover, that the corporation
has the burden of showing that the communication in issue meets all of the above re-
quirements.
Id. at 609. The court was influenced by Judge Weinstein's suggested standard as set out in 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 22, 1 503(b)[04], at 40-41.
45. 572 F.2d at 609. For an article analyzing the Divers#Fed decision, see 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
265.
46. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
47. Id. at 387.
48. See notes 40-47 supra. See also Nat'l L. J., Mar. 31, 1980, at 3, col. 3 (report of amicus
curiae briefs submitted in petition for certiorari, Upjohn Co. v. United States, by American Bar
Association and American College of Trial Lawyers advocating rejection of control group test).
49. See notes 35, 43 supra.
50. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
51. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 925
(1980).
52. The resulting uncertainty undermines a basic principle behind the value of the attorney-
client privilege, namely, that a client must be able to ascertain, prior to disclosure to counsel, that
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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in United States v.
Upjohn Company,53 recognized the conceptual difficulty in applying
the attorney-client privilege to the corporate client5 4 and chose to focus
its analysis on the particular corporate employees who claimed the
privilege.5  The court, applying the control group test,56 rejected
Upjohn's argument that communications by all of its employees were
privileged as confidential between attorney and client.57 The Sixth Cir-
cuit held that statements by those not responsible for shaping corporate
policy in response to counsel's advice5" were not entitled to protection
because these communications were not made by the client.59  The
court, narrowing the scope of protection, sought to promote free and
confidential communication between corporate decisionmakers and
counsel,60 while guarding against unjust exclusion of evidence.61
The court reasoned that restricting the privilege62 would discourage
management from disclosing to counsel, through agents, its limited
knowledge of a particular transaction.6 3 The court stated that by per-
a confidential communication will be protected from subsequent discovery. Note, Attorney-Client
Privilegefor Corporate Clients. The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424,426 (1970) ("If the
privilege is to achieve its purpose of encouraging communications, the communicants must be
able to discern at the stage of primary activity whether the communication will be privileged.").
See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text. Cf. 33 VAND. L. REV. 999, 1009 (1980) (uneven
application of standard removes predictability that is major reason for formulating any objective
test for attachment of attorney-client privilege).
53. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 925 (1980).
54. Id. at 1226. The court noted, "Since corporations are inanimate, artificial entities, the
attorney-client relationship is conceptually more difficult, and its underlying principles are less
obvious. As clients, corporations can communicate to attorneys only through agents." Id. See
also note 22 supra.
55. The court was first concerned with identifying who among the employees "personified"
the corporation to an extent sufficient to initiate and pursue the attorney-client relationship. In
deciding who could invoke the privilege the court stated: "It is only the senior management,
guiding and integrating the several operations, which can be said to possess an identity analogous
to the corporation as a whole." Id. After this determination, attention is turned to whose commu-
nications within the relationship qualify for protection under the privilege. See also note 33 supra.
56. See note 11 supra.
57. 600 F.2d at 1225.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court remanded for a determination of which communications were made by
members of Upjohn's control group, and ordered denial of the enforcement with respect to these
communications. Id. at 1227-28.
60. Id. at 1227.
61. Id. The court also rejected Upjohn's claim that the documents were protected under the
work-product doctrine. Id. at 1228 n.13. See note 8 supra.
62. 600 F.2d at 1227. See also notes 2, 11 supra.
63. 600 F.2d at 1227.
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mitting this type of indirect communication, a situation develops in
which only a corporate counsel has the complete record of details relat-
ing to any of these transactions. 4
Judge Merritt, writing for the court, stated that under the subject
matter approach senior managers would purposely disregard important
information, which sound business practice requires them to know and
use.65 Potentially harmful reports would accumulate exclusively in the
legal department,66 and managers would remain uninformed on ques-
tionable transactions.67 This policy would expand protection available
to intracorporate communications without serving either the interests
of corporate morality or stockholder equity.68
Echoing criticism leveled at the subject matter test by earlier courts, 69
Judge Merritt saw a need to limit the scope of the corporate attorney-
client privilege because of the bar it placed on disclosures of the truth.70
The privilege can achieve its objective without placing a severe burden
on discovery when, as in Upjohn, corporate agents who know the de-
tails of a transaction are located in a foreign country. 7' The subject
matter test would render any communication between these agents and
the corporation's attorney undiscoverable.72 The resultant "zone of si-
lence,"73 the court concluded, would be too broad.74
The Upjohn court reasoned that limitations embodied in the control
group test would promote corporate morality and sound business pol-
icy, protect shareholder interests, and assure access to relevant facts in





68. Id. The court stated:
The "subject matter" test encourages senior managers purposely to ignore important in-
formation they have good business reasons to know and use. Corporate counsel should
not be the exclusive repository ofunpleasant facts. The law should not encourage corpo-
rate managers to shield themselves from information about possibly illegal transactions.
Such purposeful ignorance does not serve the interests of moral corporate conduct or the
protection of stockholder equity.
Id.
69. See notes 31-34 smupra and accompanying text.
70. 600 F.2d at 1227.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See note 28 supra.
74. 600 F.2d at 1227.
75. See notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text.
(Vol. 58:1041
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sumed that expediency and predictability would result from a test with
greater ease of application.76
A closer analysis of the court's opinion, however, creates doubt
whether the control group test effectively achieves these goals. One
criticism frequently leveled at the control group test is its failure to rec-
ognize the nature of the modern corporate structure.7 Complex and
departmentalized internal organizations cause senior corporate man-
agement, or control group members, to rely heavily on information
provided to them by middle and lower level employees.78 Often top
executives endorse decisions and recommendations without further
consideration.7 9 When preparing for actual or potential litigation,
counsel must summon information from all available sources even
though only the company's higher echelon of management will respond
to the advice of counsel.8" The control group test, by protecting only
the communications of this small group of employees, prohibits those
who actually possess relevant information from making privileged dis-
closures to counsel at a time when the corporation's need to be fully
informed is greatest.8
76. Judge Merritt voiced concern with the complexity arising from a corporate system of
delegated responsibility and compartmentalized organization. 600 F.2d at 1226. Other courts
have noted the advantage of an objective test. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975) ("the rule more easily applied by
the Court, the rule more easily understood by lawyers.. . is the control group test"). Once the
control group is identified, there remains little for the court to do except decide which communica-
tions were made in furtherance of the rendering of legal advice. The subject matter test, on the
other hand, requires the multiple determinations established in note 37 supra. But see Kobak,
supra note 22, at 368 ("So heterogenous are the contexts in which an attorney's services are sought
that no objective test can displace the need for thought and judgment."); Comment, supra note 36,
at 300 ("An equitable application of the policies behind the privilege should not be sidestepped on
the grounds of expediency alone.").
77. See e.g., 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 413, 424 (1979); 15 TULSA L.J. 390, 394-95 (1979).
78. See Maurer, supra note 41, at 374-75. The Upjohn court noted the "guiding and integrat-
ing" function of senior management. See note 61 supra. It is difficult to conceive of a large
corporate structure, particularly with foreign subsidiaries such as those operated by Upjohn Co.,
where top management does not depend to a great degree on information from below and even
encourages active communication from employees lower in the structure.
79. Maurer, supra note 36, at 374-75.
80. Kobak, supra note 22, at 340, commented: "If there is any single place where society
needs the buffer of legal advice to separate the whims of a client from immediate gratification, that
place is the boardroom of the modern corporation.' It follows that a counsel more fully informed
from all levels of the corporation will offer more accurate advice. See also notes 13-15 supra and
accompanying text.
81. 47 GEO. WASH. L. RE. 413, 425 (1979).
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Applying the Upjohn rationale8 2 to the realities of the corporate en-
vironment creates an anomalous situation for three reasons. First, be-
cause communications from certain employees are not entitled to
protection, counsel may find it more difficult to elicit information from
corporate employees who recognize the potential legal consequences.13
More importantly, attorneys fearing subsequent discovery will be reluc-
tant to seek out unprivileged information even though it is vital to ren-
dering a complete legal opinion.' Counsel thus must either base
advice on speculation or risk forced disclosure of information helpful
to the client's adversary." Neither choice appears consonant with
sound business policy.
Second, the control group test, as formulated in Upjohn, may deter
internal investigations aimed at identifying possible wrongdoing or
halting questionable activities.86 The corporation's control group will
hesitate to order these self-policing programs without reasonable assur-
ance that the liability they seek to avoid will not be incurred automati-
cally.87 The noncompliance that may follow will dismantle a standard
82. See notes 62-74 supra and accompanying text.
83. One author has argued that an employee's reluctance to inform is motivated more by fear
of higher management's displeasure with the reported activities than with concern for application
of the privilege. Note, supra note 52, at 429. A definite attachment of the privilege coupled with
an urging by management for candid and confidential resj~onse, as in Upjohn, would serve to
mollify these apprehensions. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir.
1979) (because the corporation could waive the privilege, lower level employees always confide in
counsel at their own risk).
For an article proposing the institution of an executive privilege, see Note, The Attorney- Client
Privilege: .4 Look at Its Effect on the Corporate Client and the Corporate Executive, 55 IND. L.J.
407 (1980).
84. See generally Weinschel, supra note 25, at 875-76.
85. Id. The author terms this dilemma a "Hobson's choice." By whatever description, it is
clear that the corporation's position is detrimentally affected.
86. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), revpq on
rehearing, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); Miller, supra note 14, at 268-69; Miller, supra note 14, at
949; Note, supra note 14, at 306. But see In re Grand Jury Iivestigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d
Cir. 1979) (the risk of criminal or civil liability for noncompliance with laws regulating corporate
activities sufficiently ensures such investigations even without the certainty of confidentiality).
87. The potential for this abuse is particalarly high when government investigations are con-
cerned. The threat of forced disclosures supported by broad agency powers may force manage-
ment into the position where it prefers to let the agency do its own discovery, resulting in a
decrease in company sponsored fact finding. In Upjohn the situation is particularly noteworthy as
one agency offers lenient treatment for voluntary disclosure, thus encouraging an internal investi-




of corporate morality predicated on internal initiative."8
Finally, because the control group test compels corporations to resist
a broad policy of self-investigation, the opposing party, forced to con-
duct its own fact finding, faces the same burden on discovery that the
court in Upjohn sought to avoid.8 9 Confronted with a costly and time
consuming process of fact gathering, the party may abandon litigation
and thwart the aim that the restrictions on the attorney-client privilege
in corporate context were designed to promote.90
In Upjohn communications sought by the IRS were made to the
company's general counsel at the request of the board chairman. These
confidential and voluntary communications assumed a vital role in the
company's effort to eliminate corporate wrongdoing.91 The failure of
the Upjohn court to distinguish this fact pattern from one that abused
the privilege and the court's unwillingness to analyze fully the applica-
bility of other standards92 illustrates the danger inherent in an objective
test. Public policy requires a test that can be equitably applied based
on the facts of a particular case and the concerns that confront corpo-
rate management.93
88. Thus unchecked, corporate wrongdoing may adversely affect stockholders' interest to a
greater degree through loss of goodwill, strained public relations, and payment of larger monetary
penalties. The treble damage awards in an antitrust case, for example, can amount to a signifi-
cant, if not dangerous, reduction in a company's net worth. See Burnham, supra note 36, at 546.
89. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
90. The Upjohn court determined that limiting the amount of Company amassed evidence
available to the IRS would be detrimental, if not destructive, to the position taken by the IRS.
Yet, should the Company be forced to forego its own fact finding, the IRS would be subject to this
same limitation. And should the IRS decline to undertake the burden of discovery, the violation
would continue unchecked, leaving the policy of compliance with the law unaddressed.
91. The issue of waiver was addressed by the court only by way of footnote. See United
States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 925 (1980).
92. See 15 TULSA L.J. 390, 401 (1979). The court dismissed the Diversfed aecision without
analysis, and failed to mention other tests developed since Harper & Row.
93. One commentator in a policy discussion asked the question: "If a corporate employee
has the power to render a corporation liable for damages, why should he not also have the power
to make a confidential communication to counsel"? McLaughlin, supra note 34, at 33.
Another commentator has stated the policy argument in the following manner.
It would better serve the interests of society to encourage a desire for legal advice at
whatever level that desire exists within a corporation. An employee who lacks power
may not be wanting in zeal. If such an earnest soul perceives a problem while acting
within the scope of his employment and subsequently secures legal advice, the communi-
cation ought to be privileged, even if the outcome is determined by those to whom he
reports. The potential for social benefit inherent in the communication does not vary
drastically with the status of its narrator.
Kobak, supra note 22, at 368.
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The Harper & Row subject matter test 94 has received criticism nor-
mally reserved for the control group test of Westinghouse.95 Critics of
the subject matter approach demonstrate its potential for abuse and its
creation of an impediment to discovery.96 Courts, in response to the
inadequacy of both the control group and the subject matter tests, have
attempted to develop standards that address the policy of expanded
factual disclosure through discovery and the structural and regulatory
framework within which the modem' corporation must operate.97
Judges, however, have not followed these hybrid tests.98 Consequently,
executives and attorneys are unable to rely on consistent judicial appli-
cation of an attorney-client privilege rule in their corporate planning.
In addition, the current split among the circuits encourages federal fo-
rum shopping.99
The Supreme Court, in its review of Upjohn, should not be satisfied
to affirm or reject the lower court's holding. Instead, the Court should
formulate a standard that combines the need for corporate self-regula-
tion with a policy of fair adjudication. 100
94. See note 37 supra.
95. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Note, supra note 52; 33 VAND. L. REV. 999 (1980).
97. See notes 77-81 supra.
98. Only the 4mpi/clin court relied in large part on the formulations in Duplan. See notes
41-42 and 46-47 supra.
99. See 33 VAND. L. REV. 999, 1014 (1980) ("If the privilege is to have any utility, corpora-
tions must be able to determine which disclosures will be protected without being forced to predict
opposing counsel's forum choice.").
100. The Supreme Court rejected the control group test in reversing the 6th Circuit, and re-
manded the work product aspect. 49 U.S.L.W. 4093 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 79-886). The Court,
while calling for a case-by-case analysis of a corporate claim to the privilege, did formulate a
standard that offers useful guidelines. The Court extended protection to confidential communica-
tions concerning the employees' corporate duties when "the employees themselves were sufficient,
aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice."
Id. at 4096 (emphasis added). To hold otherwise would "frustrat[e] the very purpose of the privi-
lege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client to
attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation." Id. at 4095.
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